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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show the effects of limited airport capacity to handle air travel demand on individual air-
port choice of air travellers. For this, first a new method based on discrete choice theory and nonlinear programming 
techniques, which is applied in this study, is described briefly in a nontechnical manner. The main section of the paper is 
about airport choice in the Cologne region in a capacity constrained airport environment, where three qualitative different 
scenarios are analysed. Thereby it is possible to uncover the complex distributional changes in airport choice due to 
capacity constraints on the level of the individual air traveller. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Capacity constraints at airports are becoming increasingly 
more important especially in Europe. Capacity constraints 
include limited physical infrastructure like e.g. runways and 
terminal capacity; however, in determining the overall 
capacity of an airport to handle air travel demand adminis-
trative restrictions like night curfews, noise & emission 
budgets or noise & emission limits play a role, too. Limited 
airport capacity may reduce negative effects of air trans-
port on the surrounding environment of the airport. How-
ever, from the point of view of the airport and the air travel-
ler, these constraints reduce the available capacity to 
handle passenger demand and change their choice be-
haviour. Thus, it is seems sensible to incorporate the im-
pact of capacity constraints on future airport (and access 
mode) choice in a systematic and coherent way. 
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FIG 1: Impact of capacity constraints on airport choice  
 
The first choice departure airport of an air traveller may not 
necessarily be realisable in a capacity limited airport envi-
ronment, as demand exceeds supply at some airports, 
therefore some air travellers have to change their mind. 
However, the existence of sufficient supply at every airport 
is a major assumption of many airport choice models. A 
possible approach to model airport choice which takes 
account of a capacity limited airport environment endoge-
nously is therefore described briefly in a non-technical 
manner. For full technical details of the algorithm the 
reader is referred to Gelhausen (2008b). Here, the focus 
lies rather on the practical consequences of limited airport 
capacity on airport choice of air travellers, which are dem-
onstrated exemplarily by means of future scenarios of 
airport choice in the Cologne region (Gelhausen et. al. 
2008), keeping analysis as simple and clearly arranged as 
possible to uncover the underlying mechanism. 
 
FIG 1 illustrates three possible consequences of capacity 
constraints at airports: 
 
? If travel disutility is high from the point of view of 
the air traveller and capacity expansion is possi-
ble, airport capacity might be enlarged. 
? On the other hand, if travel disutility is low and 
capacity expansion is not possible, the air travel 
demand surplus might be served by neighbouring 
airports.  
? However, if both travel disutility is high and ca-
pacity expansion is not possible, demand is most 
likely lost. 
 
Germany has a rather dense network of airports, so the 
focus of the analysis lies on the second case (the north-
west quadrant of FIG 1), where capacity exceeding air 
travel demand is served by neighbouring airports. Every 
few years the German Air Traveller Survey is conducted at 
major German airports. In 2003, more than 200 000 air 
travellers were interviewed at 19 international airports (e.g. 
Frankfurt/Main and Düsseldorf) and five regional airports 
(e.g. Frankfurt Hahn). The survey reveals that about 67% 
choose the nearest airport for departure; however, so-
called spatial planning regions are served at least by three 
airports, whereas the maximum number is 14. On aver-
age, a spatial planning region is served by eight airports 
(Wilken et al. 2007, p. 172). Therefore, although two thirds 
of the air travellers choose the nearest airport for depar-
ture, there is a considerable degree of competition among 
airports. 
 
2. METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The methodological fundament of airport and access 
mode choice analysis in this paper is given by the concept 
of discrete choice theory. The central building block in 
analysing choice behaviour is the assumption of individual 
utility maximisation. Utility serves as an abstract measure 
of the subjective attractiveness of an alternative derived 
from the alternative attributes of each alternative, like e.g. 
access cost, access time and supply of non-stop and low-
cost flights to the chosen destination in the case of airport 
and access mode choice. Often this function is a weighted 
sum of the alternative attributes, with the weights depend-
ing on subjective preferences of the decision maker, i.e. 
here the air traveller. The decision maker is assumed to 
choose the one with the highest utility, but from an external 
point of view, this individual utility maximisation process is 
not fully measurable and thus represents a random vari-
able. Therefore, from an external point of view, the utility 
function is decomposable into a deterministic component 
composed of the aforementioned decision-relevant alter-
native attributes and an additive stochastic component, 
which has a given stochastic distribution with expectation 
zero and a given variance. As a result, only evidence in 
form of choice probabilities relating to the alternative with 
the highest utility can be given. However, summed up over 
homogenous market segments, these choice probabilities 
equal market shares by alternative and market segment. 
FIG 2 illustrates the idea of discrete choice models (Gel-
hausen et al. 2008). For a detailed introduction into dis-
crete choice models see e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985). 
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FIG 2: Concept of discrete choice models (Gelhausen et 
al. 2008) 
 
The principle of individual utility maximisation is employed 
to integrate capacity constraints in a systematic and co-
herent manner in an airport and access mode choice 
model based on discrete choice analysis. The idea of the 
capacity constrained airport choice model approach is to 
minimise the loss of personal welfare of an air traveller 
caused by limited airport capacity and thus assumes air 
travellers adapting to capacity limits in the most economic 
manner. 
 
The loss of personal welfare of an air traveller depends on 
the one hand on the relative attractiveness of the available 
alternatives, i.e. possible departure airports. The more 
unequal he prefers the alternatives in his choice set, the 
greater his personal loss of welfare due to a departure 
other than from his first choice airport therefore is and thus 
he tends to increase his efforts to depart from a certain 
airport. The aforementioned efforts include e.g. early book-
ing and especially paying higher ticket prices in the long 
run. 
 
On the other hand, the loss of personal welfare of an air 
traveller also depends on the aforementioned efforts nec-
essary to depart from a specific airport. Therefore, there 
exists an equilibrium for every air traveller between the 
necessary efforts to depart from his first choice airport and 
the loss of welfare due to departing from a different airport 
than his first choice. These additional efforts necessary to 
depart from his most favoured airport, which has not 
enough capacity to handle its whole potential air travel 
demand, are represented by the so-called airport-specific 
“synthetic price”. 
 
More technically spoken, available capacity of all airports 
is filled up simultaneously with air travel demand in de-
creasing order of utility differences for each air traveller 
until the capacity limit of an airport is reached. This indi-
vidual utility maximisation process is implemented with the 
help of the synthetic price concept: The more air travel 
demand exceeds available capacity at a given airport, the 
higher the value of the synthetic price is for this airport. In 
particular, the synthetic price takes a value of zero at an 
airport with enough capacity to handle air travel demand. 
In an overall equilibrium between air travel demand and air 
travel supply represented by airport capacities, airport 
attractiveness of constrained airports is artificially reduced 
by means of the airport-specific synthetic prices and 
thereby capacity exceeding demand is reallocated to air-
ports with free capacity according to individual utility 
maximisation. As a result, all capacity constraints are met 
with a minimum loss of personal welfare from the point of 
view of the individual air traveller. FIG 3 summarises the 
algorithm in brief. 
 
Idea: The higher the loss in personal welfare (utility) from alternative to 
alternative, the higher the efforts to get a “slot” for the best 
alternative, e.g. by early booking or paying higher prices.
Approach: Capacity at airports is filled up in this manner simultaneously 
across market segments, trip origin and trip destination.
Realisation: Increase so-called “synthetic price” to decrease airport 
attractiveness and thus redistribute excess demand until capacity 
constraints are met.  
 
FIG 3: Modelling capacity constraints in airport choice 
(Gelhausen 2008a, p. 196) 
 
3. THE IMPACT OF LIMITED AIRPORT CAPACITY 
ON AIRPORT CHOICE – THE COLOGNE REGION 
 
3.1 Market segments and limited airport capacity 
 
The model chosen to analyse airport choice in a capacity 
constrained airport environment is based upon an en-
hanced nested logit approach (Gelhausen 2007, Gel-
hausen 2008b). The base model is described in Gel-
hausen and Wilken (2006). Market segments are defined 
by trip purpose and trip destination: 
 
? Journeys to domestic destinations, either for pri-
vate (BRD P) or business purpose (BRD B) 
? Journeys to European destinations for private 
purpose, subdivided into short-stay (EUR S) and 
holiday (EUR H) trip 
? Journeys to European destinations for business 
reasons (EUR B) 
? Journeys to intercontinental destinations, either 
for private (INT P) or business purpose (INT G) 
 
TAB 1 describes the relative sensitivity by market segment 
with regard to limited airport capacity. The higher the 
value, the higher the general propensity of an air traveller 
is therefore to choose a different airport, if the airport ca-
pacity of his first choice airport is not sufficient to serve its 
whole potential demand. Hence, at least some air travel-
lers have to choose an airport other than their most fa-
voured, as a reason of demand exceeding supply. TAB 1 
shows clearly that business travellers are more prepared 
to undertake additional efforts to depart from their first 
choice airport by e.g. paying higher prices than private 
travellers. As an example, if ticket prices were increased to 
account for the capacity situation at an airport, then an air 
traveller of the European business segment values 17.40 
Euro as much as a private traveller of the domestic seg-
ment values 1 Euro. In this respect, the reciprocal values 
of TAB 1 represent the general willingness-to-pay of trav-
ellers of a certain market segment. For example, if a pri-
vate air traveller to a domestic destination is willing to pay 
1 Euro, then a business traveller to a European destination 
is willing to pay 17.40 Euro. Therefore, as a reason of the 
higher willingness-to-pay of the business segment, it is 
much more likely that a private traveller changes his mind 
and departs from a different airport than paying a higher 
ticket price at a heavily congested airport. 
 
Market segment Market segmet specific sensitivity
to limited airport capacity
BRD Private 17,40
BRD Business 2,74
EUR Short-stay 19,75
EUR Holiday 21,55
EUR Business 1,00
INT Private 5,39
INT Business 4,45
 
 
TAB 1: Market segment specific sensitivity to limited air-
port capacity 
 
However, the individual willingness-to-pay of a specific air 
traveller depends not only on the general willingness-to-
pay of the market segment he belongs to, but also on the 
relative attractiveness of the airports from his individual 
point of view. If he perceives possible departure airports to 
his chosen destination very differently, his individual will-
ingness-to-pay rises and may outweigh the general will-
ingness-to-pay of “his” market segment, thus increasing 
his overall willingness-to-pay and vice versa. 
 
Intercontinental air travellers are generally more set to pay 
higher ticket prices instead of choosing a different airport 
because of the restricted set of good alternatives. In con-
trast, the willingness to pay higher ticket prices as a rea-
son of a restricted supply of capacity at some airports is 
comparatively low in the market segment of private do-
mestic and private European travel, mainly because of a 
number of good alternative airports and more price-
sensitive air travellers. 
 
Generally, there is a tendency of business travellers 
crowding out private travellers and intercontinental travel-
lers pushing away travellers to domestic and European 
destinations at congested airports. 
 
3.2 Scope of the study 
 
Subject of this study is airport choice of air travellers in the 
light of capacity constraints in the airport system. The 
Cologne region (see FIG 4) serves as an example to ana-
lyse the effects of limited capacity to handle air travel de-
mand on airport choice as it lies in the vicinity of some 
airports. The study ties in with the results from Gelhausen, 
Wilken and Berster (2008). 
 
Relative size of the market segments: 
BRD P: 23.6% 
BRD B: 36.4% 
EUR S: 6.2% 
EUR H: 15.2% 
EUR B: 5.0% 
INT P: 7.5% 
INT B: 6.1% 
Berlin
 
 
FIG 4: Scenario definition and Spatial Planning Regions of 
Germany (Gelhausen et al. 2008) 
 
Furthermore, the region is well connected to the hub air-
port of Frankfurt/Main (FRA) by the Intercity Express 
(ICE), so that travel time from Cologne main station to 
FRA is around one hour. Air travel demand from the Co-
logne region is mainly served by Cologne airport (CGN), 
Düsseldorf airport (DUS) and FRA. Three specific destina-
tions were chosen exemplarily to analyse airport choice by 
market segment: 
 
? Berlin for domestic air travel 
? Barcelona in Spain for European air travel 
? Dallas in the USA for intercontinental air travel 
 
All three aforementioned airports are connected by a direct 
flight service to Berlin and Barcelona, however, only FRA 
serves Dallas via a direct flight. 
 
Low-cost flights play a major role especially in European 
air travel. Both CGN and DUS offer low-cost flights to 
Barcelona, however, the weekly flight frequency is signifi-
cant higher at DUS than at CGN (28 flights/week vs. 7 
flights/week in summer 2005). 
 
Necessary data for analysis originates from different sour-
ces (Berster et al. 2005; Die Bahn 2005a, b, c; Deutsche 
Flughäfen 2005; INVERMO 2005; OAG 2005; Taxi 2005; 
Verkehrsverbünde 2005). Market segments were weighted 
by actual travel volume in summer 2005 by the aforemen-
tioned three destinations in the subsequent analysis of 
Acces
Flight
s (car, train etc.)
Barcelona
Dallas
Berlin Trip destination
Cologne
Cologne Trip origin
airport choice in the light of limited capacity. Their relative 
size is illustrated in FIG 4. 
 
3.3 Scenario 1: Limited capacity at DUS 
 
FIG 5 shows the market share of DUS by market segment 
against its unsatisfied demand potential. The demand 
potential of a specific airport is the number of air travellers, 
who want to depart from this airport. For example, 0.05 
corresponds to 5% of air travellers who want to depart 
from DUS to their chosen destination; however, they have 
to depart from a different airport because of insufficient 
capacity at DUS to handle its whole demand potential. The 
crucial question now is which individual air travellers pre-
cisely belong to the unsatisfied demand potential and 
which airport they choose instead. If we e.g. expect to 
increase air travel demand by 100% in the next 15 years, a 
value of 0.75 represents a scenario in which DUS is able 
to handle 50% of the additional demand developing in the 
future. A value of 0 on the x-axis corresponds to a sce-
nario with sufficient capacity at DUS; thus it is possible 
that every air traveller chooses his first choice airport he 
wants to depart from. All other airports are assumed to be 
constraint-free in the first scenario; however, this assump-
tion is removed successively in further scenarios to show 
more complex interactions between several capacity con-
straints. 
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FIG 5: Market share of DUS by market segment against 
unsatisfied demand potential 
 
If airport capacity at DUS is limited and potential demand 
exceeds supply, the crowding-out effect is mainly at the 
expense of private air passengers travelling to domestic 
and European destinations as FIG 5 illustrates. For exam-
ple, the share of short-stay travellers to European destina-
tions reduces from 72% to 26%, if DUS can just handle 
50% of its demand potential. Likewise, the share of holiday 
travellers reduces from 47% to about 8%. However, the 
assumption of DUS only being able to serve half of its 
(future) demand is rather severe and not a realistic option 
for at least the near future, but it only serves to show the 
underlying mechanism and thus punctuates the effects of 
limited capacity to handle air transport demand on individ-
ual airport choice. 
 
In contrast, the business segments are comparatively 
stable: The share of domestic business travel declines 
from 14% to 12%, the market share of European business 
travel reduces from 47% to 45% and intercontinental busi-
ness at DUS is reduced from 25% to 19%. 
 
FIG 6 shows the market share of neighbouring airports 
against the unsatisfied demand potential of DUS. The total 
market share of DUS decreases from 23% to 12%, if DUS 
can only handle 50% of its demand potential. The demand 
surplus of DUS is mainly served by CGN: Its total market 
share rises from 71% to 82%, whereas the share of FRA 
remains around 4% to 5%. The airports Dortmund (DTM), 
Frankfurt Hahn (HHN) and Niederrhein (NRN) serve a 
negligible share of the demand and their market share 
increases just marginally. 
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FIG 6: Market share by airport against unsatisfied demand 
potential at DUS (scenario 1) 
 
3.4 Scenario 2: Limited capacity at DUS and CGN 
 
In this scenario, CGN is assumed to operate already at its 
capacity limit and therefore cannot absorb any demand 
surplus of DUS such as in scenario 1. The purpose of this 
scenario is to show the effects of limited airport capacity 
on airport choice without having a likewise airport nearby, 
serving as a substitute for the unsatisfied demand poten-
tial at the original constrained airport. The market segment 
specific results of limited air transport capacity at DUS 
under the assumption of CGN operating at its capacity 
limit are very similar to scenario 1 (FIG 5); therefore analy-
sis is focussed on market share by airport. 
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FIG 7: Market share by airport against unsatisfied demand 
potential at DUS (scenario 2) 
 
FIG 7 shows the market share of neighbouring airports 
against the unsatisfied demand potential of DUS. The total 
market share of DUS again decreases from 23% to 12%, if 
DUS can only handle 50% of its demand potential. The 
demand surplus of DUS is now mainly served by FRA, as 
a reason of CGN being assumed to be already at its ca-
pacity limit in this scenario: The total market share of FRA 
rises from 4% to 15%. The airports DTM, HHN and NRN 
in turn serve only a negligible share of the demand and 
their market share increases just marginally with increas-
ing gap between demand potential and demand actually 
served at DUS. This is mainly a result of FRA having 
enough free capacity and being the better substitute than 
DTM, HHN and NRN because of the good access from the 
point of view of the Cologne region and the better supply 
of non-stop flights to the aforementioned destinations. 
Here, the ICE plays a major role in providing good surface 
access from the Cologne region to FRA. 
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FIG 8: Changes in passenger distribution at CGN against 
unsatisfied demand potential at DUS 
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FIG 9: Market share of FRA in intercontinental and Euro-
pean holiday travel against unsatisfied demand potential at 
DUS 
 
However, although the overall air transport demand at 
CGN remains constant due to the capacity limit, there are 
distinct distributional changes among the seven market 
segments as FIG 8 illustrates. There is a slight increase in 
market share in the segments of domestic and European 
business travel, but the market share of short-stay air 
passengers to European destinations at CGN increases 
rather strong from 28% to 52%. On the other hand, the 
market share of holiday travellers at CGN first steps up 
with increasing distance between demand potential and 
demand actually served at DUS to 53%, but then falls to 
about 44%. The changes in market structure at CGN occur 
at the expense of the segments of intercontinental travel to 
Dallas: Private travel falls from 34% to 23% and business 
travel from 49% to 43%. They mainly switch to FRA and 
due to the good surface access and supply of non-stop 
flights the losses in personal welfare of these air travellers 
are rather small. 
 
FIG 9 displays the distributional effects of limited air trans-
port capacity at DUS and CGN on the market segments of 
intercontinental and European holiday travel to Dallas: The 
market share of FRA rises from 32% to 43% in the seg-
ment of private intercontinental travellers and from 25% to 
37% in the intercontinental business segment depending 
on the gap between demand potential and demand actu-
ally served at DUS. The increase in market share in Euro-
pean holiday travel is even stronger: The share of FRA lies 
in a range between 0.08% and 45% depending on the 
capacity deficit in DUS. 
 
FRA is an attractive alternative as a departure airport for 
intercontinental travel to Dallas and European holiday 
travel to Barcelona from the viewpoint of the Cologne 
region, as it offers non-stop flights to both destinations and 
access time is acceptable due to the high-speed intercity 
connection (ICE) between Cologne main station and FRA: 
Travel time is about 65 minutes. Therefore, about half of 
the passengers departing from FRA to Dallas or Barcelona 
take the ICE to the airport (see TAB 2). 
 
Market segment Share of ICE passengers
at FRA
INP P (Dallas) 50.8%
INT B (Dallas) 47.9%
EUR H 54.9%
 
 
TAB 2: Share of ICE passengers at FRA 
 
Indeed, this substitution effect from DUS to FRA in inter-
continental and European holiday travel works in a large 
part across CGN, thus not being unidirectional but rather 
complex in structure, as FIG 8 illustrates. However, the 
major assumption of this scenario is enough capacity at 
FRA even to handle the demand surplus of DUS and 
therefore e.g. no capacity constraint-induced increase in 
ticket price, which is rather unrealistic, but in this case it is 
a main reason for many holiday travellers to choose FRA. 
This leads over to the third scenario with capacity limited 
at FRA, too. 
 
3.5 Scenario 3: Limited capacity at DUS, CGN and FRA 
 
In the last scenario presented, both CGN and FRA are 
assumed to operate already at their capacity limit and 
therefore they cannot absorb any demand surplus of DUS 
such as in scenario 1 and 2, respectively. The aim of the 
last scenario is to show the impact of limited airport capac-
ity on airport choice without having any likewise airport 
within a medium distance, thus there is no airport with a 
comparable supply of flights nearby serving as an almost 
perfect substitute for the unsatisfied demand potential at 
the original airport. The market segment specific results of 
limited air transport capacity at DUS under the assumption 
of CGN and FRA operating at their capacity limit are again 
very similar to scenario 1 (FIG 5) and thus analysis is 
focussed on market share by airport. 
 
FIG 10 shows the market share of airports serving a sig-
nificant amount of air travel demand of the Cologne region 
in this scenario against the unsatisfied demand potential of 
DUS. Like the other two scenarios, the total market share 
of DUS decreases from 23% down to 12%, if DUS can 
only handle 50% of its demand potential. As FRA and 
CGN cannot absorb any demand surplus from DUS by 
scenario definition, excess demand is now mainly served 
by the smaller airports DTM, HHN and NRN: The total 
market share of DTM rises from 0.7% to 6.9%, the market 
share of HHN increases from 0.3% to 1.9% and the mar-
ket share of NRN rises from 0.05% to 3.0%.  
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FIG 10: Market share by airport against unsatisfied de-
mand potential at DUS (scenario 3) 
 
TAB 3 illustrates the effects of limited capacity as de-
scribed in this scenario on market segment specific airport 
choice. Here, DUS is assumed to only handle 50% of its 
demand potential and neither FRA nor CGN can absorb 
any excess demand. If we look at airport choice as a 
whole, any demand surplus is served by the airports DTM, 
HHN and NRN and thus this represents a zero-sum game: 
The overall demand increases at DTM, HHN and NRN as 
much as it decreases at DUS, because FRA and CGN 
cannot absorb any demand surplus from DUS, thus their 
overall demand level remains the same. However, on a 
microscopic level, i.e. on the level of the individual air 
traveller, there are significant, in part even massive 
changes concerning the question which air passenger 
departs from which airport. TAB 3 shows these changes at 
the aforementioned six airports by market segment. How-
ever, the assumption of DUS only being able to serve half 
of its (future) demand is as already outlined above rather 
severe and not a realistic option for at least the near fu-
ture, but it only serves to show the underlying mechanism 
and thus punctuates the effects of limited capacity to han-
dle air transport demand on individual airport choice. 
 
FRA DUS CGN DTM HHN NRN
BRD P 0.32% -5.25% -9.24% 12.95% 0.01% 0.06%
BRD B 0.04% -1.53% 0.87% 0.42% 0.00% 0.01%
EUR S 0.51% -49.50% 14.56% 11.45% 5.62% 8.70%
EUR H 7.44% -38.60% 9.35% 9.23% 2.78% 8.24%
EUR B 0.05% -1.90% 1.84% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INT P -7.90% -7.89% -13.82% 9.69% 5.81% 8.18%
INT B -10.95% -2.01% 7.81% 1.90% 0.93% 1.43%
 
 
TAB 3: Differences in market share due to limited capacity 
at DUS 
 
As a reason of limited capacity, DUS loses market share in 
all market segments, however, the distribution is very 
uneven. The losses are by far greater in the segments of 
travel for private purposes than for business reasons. This 
is mainly due to the fact that business travellers have a 
higher general willingness-to-pay, as already illustrated by 
TAB 1. For example, the share of European short-stay 
travellers at DUS decreases from a basic value of 72% to 
22.5% by 49.5 points. The basic values are represented 
by the “no-constraints-scenario”, which can be found for 
DUS and CGN in FIG 5 and FIG 8, respectively. Losses in 
market share in the business segments at DUS are very 
small and they are mainly absorbed by CGN and DTM. 
The airport CGN faces a rather large increase in market 
share in private European travel and intercontinental busi-
ness travel, however these increases are largely at the 
expense of private domestic and international travel, since 
overall airport capacity at CGN is fixed in this scenario and 
thus any changes in market segment air travel demand at 
CGN are a zero-sum game overall. Travellers of both 
segments switch to the smaller airports of DTM, HHN and 
NRN and take a stop-over flight instead. 
 
However, these small airports increasing their market 
share in intercontinental private travel thus much is essen-
tially a result of the assumptions of the scenario, i.e. DUS 
can only handle half of its demand potential and no air 
traveller cancels his journey altogether. This also leads to 
large losses in personal welfare of air travellers, as many 
of them depart from much less attractive airports from their 
point of view. However, this scenario serves to show the 
complex interrelations between the general willingness-to-
pay of an air passenger and the relative attractiveness of 
an airport given a specific destination, which together 
determine the individual willingness-to-pay of a specific air 
passenger: Private travellers have a low general willing-
ness-to-pay compared to business travellers and thus are 
crowded out at DUS much more with increasing capacity 
constraints, which lead to higher prices at DUS at least in 
the long run. Private air passengers to European destina-
tions mainly switch to CGN, DTM, HHN and NRN partly 
because of the good supply of low-cost flights compared to 
other airports and partly because of these airports being 
situated nearest and having still free capacity, and thus 
displacing some private travellers to domestic and inter-
continental at CGN, which in turn mainly switch to DTM. 
Apart from the increase in access time and access cost, 
the airport DTM is not such much worse than CGN from 
the point of view of an air passenger, which originally 
wanted to depart from CGN to an intercontinental destina-
tion via a stop-over flight. 
 
Interestingly, FRA loses some market share in interconti-
nental travel. This is due to some European holiday travel-
lers, who rather prefer a better supply of non-stop flights 
instead of a lower ticket price, switching from DUS partly to 
FRA with overall capacity being fixed there. Therefore, the 
share of some market segments has to decline, so that the 
capacity constraint is not violated. Some private interconti-
nental air travellers thus depart from a smaller airport like 
e.g. DTM instead and take a cheaper stop-over flight, 
whereas some intercontinental business travellers depart 
from Cologne due to the shorter access and take a stop-
over flight as well. The disadvantage of a stop-over flight 
from CGN is at least partially compensated by the signifi-
cantly better access to the airport. 
 
The last scenario shows very clearly how capacity con-
straints at one airport may induce secondary capacity 
constraints effects at other airports and thus leading to 
considerable spill-over effects. These spill-over effects 
cause at least complex distributional changes in individual 
airport choice and may even lead to capacity constraints at 
previously unconstrained airports. 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper first shows briefly how to allow for capacity 
constraints in airport choice models based on discrete 
choice theory. The chosen approach combines discrete 
choice theory with methods of nonlinear programming 
techniques to implement capacity constraints. Thereby, it 
is possible to analyse the impact of future capacity con-
straints at airports to handle air transport demand on air-
port choice. 
 
The main section of this paper is about the practical as-
pects of how insufficient capacity to handle air passengers 
affects individual airport choice. The study is conducted by 
means of the example of the Cologne region, which is 
mainly served by the three airports DUS, CGN and FRA in 
the case of sufficient capacity. To allow for qualitative 
different conditions regarding the capacity situation, three 
scenarios are analysed: In the first case, only DUS has 
insufficient capacity to handle all potential air passengers, 
in the second case, both DUS and CGN are limited in 
airport capacity and the last scenario assumes all three 
airports to be limited in capacity. In each scenario, differ-
ent levels of insufficient capacity for DUS are analysed. 
 
The study shows the significant effects of limited capacity 
to handle air travel demand at an airport on the choice 
behaviour of individual air travellers and uncovers the 
individual changes in airport choice, especially in a decen-
tralised airport environment like in Germany. These effects 
reach out far beyond the original airport suffering from 
capacity constraints. 
 
Insufficient capacity at some airports leads to demand 
being distributed among more airports and in a different 
way unlike the case of sufficient capacity at every airport. 
Thereby, even airports without limited airport capacity are 
affected, as demand is distributed differently among mar-
ket segments in the light of capacity constraints at other 
airports, even though the overall demand level is un-
changed. In general, there is a strong tendency of busi-
ness travellers crowding out private air travellers at con-
gested airports, as their general willingness to pay is much 
larger in most cases compared to the leisure segment. 
However, a second important factor, which determines 
crowding-out effects, is the relative attractiveness of the 
airports from the point of view of the individual air traveller 
and his chosen destination. If possible departure airports 
are perceived very differently by the individual air passen-
ger, his individual willingness-to-pay rises and may out-
weigh the general willingness-to-pay of the market seg-
ment he belongs to. Therefore, universally valid conclu-
sions are not possible and have to be made on an individ-
ual case-by-case basis. 
 
Competition may decrease at congested airports; how-
ever, small remote airports are the beneficiaries, as their 
market share increases. Depending on initial conditions 
and the extent of capacity constraints, spill-over effects 
can even lead to capacity constraints at even more air-
ports, thus intensifying the effects of limited airport capac-
ity to handle air travel demand. From the point of view of 
the air traveller, personal welfare is reduced, as e.g. travel 
time and travel cost increase or he has to take a more 
unfavourable flight. 
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